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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

NO. 47094-2019

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

Cassia County Case No.

)

V.

CRO 1 - 1 8-43 150

)
)

CLIFTON RYAN LASHLEY

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

Has Clifton Ryan Lashley failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
by imposing a uniﬁed sentence often years, with two years determinate for Assault With

discretion

the Intent to

Commit

a Serious Felony?

ARGUMENT
LashleV Has Failed T0
A.

Show That The

District

Court Abused

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Clifton Lashley sexually assaulted Sara Mraz.

ﬁle

Its

named “Lashley 47094

(PSI, pp.3, 9, 85.)

Over

psi”).)

the next

(PSI, pp.3-10 (page citations to electronic

Lashley and the Victim met on an online dating application.

few days, Lashley and Ms. Mraz exchanged

text

messages and

had a few

pictures until meeting in person at a restaurant called Andrade’s. (PSI, p.3-4.) Lashley

drinks prior to meeting With Ms. Mraz, so he took an

After dinner Lashley asked Ms.

Mraz

Uber

home,

for a ride

ride t0 the restaurant. (PSI. pp.4, 90.)

t0

Which she agreed, so they drove

to

Lashley’s home. (PSI, p.3.)

At

his

home, Lashley began

t0 kiss

Ms. Mraz, and Ms. Mraz

(PSI, pp.3-4.) Lashley did not stop but grabbed the

(PSI, pp.3-4.)

her.

you

t0 stop.”

pulled

Ms. Mraz

(PSI, p.4.)

told Lashley she

told

him “n0” and

back 0f Ms. Mraz’s hair and continued kissing

was “not going

t0

have sex” with him and “I want

Lashley then forced Ms. Mraz into his bed where he pinned her down,

down her pants and underwear and began penetrating her vagina With his penis without her

consent.

(PSI, pp.3-4.)

Lashley also digitally assaulted Ms. Mraz’s vagina, as

if

“punching” her vagina. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Ms. Mraz begged Lashley t0 stop as she told him

bad” and “please stop.” (PSI,

p.4.)

(PSI, p.5.) Lashley turned the light

she

he was
it

“hurt

Lashley ﬁnally stopped after ejaculating 0n Ms. Mraz’s back.

on and Ms. Mraz saw her blood on

off with his t—shirt and then looked up at Ms.

As

“stop.”

Mraz and

asked,

his hand,

“D0 you

was driving away from Lashley’s apartment, Ms. Mraz had t0

which he cleaned

me?”

hate

pull over to

(PSI, pp.3-5.)

throw up. (PSI,

p.5.)

Lashley thereafter sent texts t0 Ms. Mraz
got the best 0f me
“I told

you

up,” and “I

I

“Don’t hate

been awhile. .. Iwant more.” (PSI, p.6

wasn’t going to have sex with you

I

me Sara,

imma

apologize one more time.

Mraz

stating, “A11

My penis

Ms. Mraz

replied,

asked you to stop. T0 please stop. Itried to get

You tasted

as

good

as

your talk, I’m a

.. i

you

me goin. Hope you can move past so we can hang again. Sweet dreams.”

Later Lashley sent a text t0 Ms.

Ilike you.

(ellipses original).)

am bleeding.” (Id.) Lashley then replied, “So sorry” and “Ok Sara.

your no better but
got

it’s

stating,

shoulda respected

said.

..

all that

hype

(PSI, p.6 (verbatim).)

squirter, I’ll

pee 0n

u, I

had sex

just a

min

ago.

now

..

all

the sudden

A11 that screaming wasn’t pain.

good thing
had

fun.

..

I

..

I

u wanna be good. Whatever, one sandwich shy of a

know

the difference.

..

u

screenshot our bumble conversation about sex.

from being a woman. ..

are bleeding

Good

picnic.

I’m a good guy. .. coulda

luck,

possibly more!” (PSI, p.7 (verbatim).)

A grand jury indicted Lashley on one count of ﬁrst degree kidnapping, one count of rape
and one count of forcible sexual penetration by use 0f a foreign

(R., pp.29-30.)

object.

Lashley

pled guilty to one count 0f assault with intent t0 commit a serious felony pursuant t0 a plea

agreement dismissing the other charges.

(R., pp.68-75;

court sentenced Lashley t0 a ten year sentence, With

(R.,

pp.81-84; 05/29/19 Tr., p.31, L.13

— p.32,

L.5.)

03/26/19

Tr., p.4,

L.4

— p.15.

L.23.)

The

two years determinant, and a ﬁne 0f $1,000.
Lashley ﬁled a timely notice of appeal.

(R.,

pp.92-94.)

On

appeal, Lashley argues that “the district court abused

its

discretion

by imposing a

sentence of ten years, with two years ﬁxed, as opposed to retaining jurisdiction.”

brief, p.5.)

him to

Lashley has failed t0 show that the

ten years, With two years

Standard

B.

district court

abused

its

discretion

(Appellant’s

by sentencing

ﬁxed and a $1,000 ﬁne.

Of Review

The length 0f a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

It is

presumed

50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State
that the

is

a sentence

is

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

probable term of conﬁnement. Li. (citing State

Where

V.

V.

will be the defendant's

Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).

Within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

it

a clear abuse 0f discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing

State V. Lundguist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d

for an abuse

of discretion,

this

27 (2000)).

When reviewing

Court must analyze “Whether the

a lower court’s decision

trial court: (1)

the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) acted Within the outer boundaries 0f

its

correctly perceived

discretion; (3) acted

consistently with the legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available to

reached

its

decision

by the

V.

MV Fun Life,

to grant probation “is

Le Vegue, 164 Idaho

110, 113,

0f sentencing t0 deny probation,

LashleV Has

To bear
that,

V.

to the district judge’s discretion.”

426 P.3d 461, 464 (2018)

Idaho 165, 166, 296 P.3d 371, 372 (2013).

C.

its

is

(internal quotation omitted).

a matter 0f discretion.”

“When

m

Likewise,

State V. Latneau, 154

a court has sufﬁcient information at the time

reﬁlsal t0 retain jurisdiction for further evaluation

is

not an

Baker, 153 Idaho 692, 699, 290 P.3d 1284, 1291 (Ct. App. 2012).

Shown N0 Abuse Of The

District Court’s Discretion

the burden of demonstrating an abuse 0f discretion, the appellant

under any reasonable View of the

facts, the

Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).

To

sentence

was

excessive.

must

establish

State V. Farwell, 144

establish that the sentence

was

appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence

t0

(4)

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

committed

“the decision whether to retain jurisdiction

abuse of discretion.” State

and

exercise ofreason.” State V. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 448 P.3d 1005,

1019 (2019) (quoting Lunneborg

The decision

it;

excessive, the

was appropriate

accomplish the sentencing goals ofprotecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

Li. at 736,

170 P.3d

at

401.

A sentence is reasonable “‘if

it

primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or
rehabilitation, or retribution.”

(2017) (quoting State

V.

appears necessary t0 accomplish the

all

of the related goals of deterrence,

State V. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895—96,

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

392 P.3d 1228, 1236—37

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).

The sentence imposed
The

19-910.

district court

is

within the statutory limits of imprisonment up to 15 years. I.C. §

properly applied the legal standards 0f I.C. § 19-2521 and considered

“the Toohill factors and the nature of the offense; the character of the offender; any mitigating 0r

aggravating factors; fulﬁlling the objectives of protecting society and achieving deterrence,
rehabilitation 0r retribution.” (05/29/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.13-23.)

The record supports

the district court’s sentence.

misdemeanor convictions, Lashley has a history 0f drug,
12.)

He

Although

theft

it

resulted in only three

and assault charges. (PSI, pp.10-

has an extensive history of substance abuse. (PSI, pp.18—20.) Lashley maintained that

the sexual attack

district court as

0n the Victim was consensual (PSI,

p.50), a claim speciﬁcally rejected

by

the

“nonbelievable.” (05/29/19 Tr., p.28, Ls.8-13). In part, because Lashley had been

accused of a very similar sexual assault before. (PSI,

p. 50;

05/29/19

The psychosexual evaluator provisionally diagnosed Lashley

T11, p.27,

L.22 — p. 28, L.

7.)

as having an “Aggressive/Force

Sexual Behavior” paraphilic disorder for having a fascination with forcing sex on others. (PSI,

p.

50.)

Lashley “presented With a full-ﬂedged personality disorder,” meaning he tended to “display

[his]

pathological characteristics across many, if not

work relationships, family relationships, romantic
strangers.”

(PSI, p. 51.)

all,

areas of [his

life],

including friendships,

relationships, children, acquaintances,

The psychosexual examiner evaluated Lashley

and even

as a “moderate risk t0

reoffend Within the next ﬁve to ten years as compared to other sexual offenders” even assuming

he participated in sex offender and substance abuse treatments. (PSI,
Lashley

is

a threat t0 the safety of the

community and

is

p. 52.)

The record shows

not currently amenable t0 probation.

Lashley argues that the mitigating factors—his statements of remorse and regret for his
actions, the support

t0

of his family, that he does not have a history 0f Violence, and that he

complete any treatment necessary—show an abuse of discretion.

is

willing

(Appellants brief pp.4,

5.)

Lashley’s argument does not

show an abuse 0f discretion. The

and aggression against another person’s

Will,

district court stated

female or male, cannot be tolerated in

“dominance

this society.”

(05/29/19 TL, p.30, Ls.7—9.) The district court reviewed the psychosexual evaluation and the LSI

and determined
this time.”

that

Lashley was “a risk t0 society” and he was “not amenable to supervision

(05/29/19 Tr., p.30, Ls.15-17.)

The

district court also

treatment” Lashley’s “risk t0 society can be reduced” and he

community and be

part 0f your daughter’s life in a reasonable

completed.” (05/29/ 19

however. (05/29/19

The

T12, p.32, Ls.8-15.)

concluded that “With proper

would be “able
amount 0f time

t0 return t0 the

after treatment is

That return to the community would be through parole,

Tr., p.31, Ls.2-12.)

district court

contemplated the facts in

this serious case,

mitigating factors did not merit a lesser sentence than that imposed.
presents a risk t0 society, and that he

has failed to show that the

is

district court

that a lesser sentence than that

and the record shows

The record shows

that

that the

Lashley

not a suitable candidate for retained jurisdiction. Lashley

abused

its

discretion in sentencing, and has failed t0

show

imposed was the only reasonable option under the circumstances.

CONCLUSION
The

at

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment of the

DATED this 26th day of December, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

ZACHARI
Paralegal

S.

HALLETT

district court.

CERTEICATE OF SERVICE
I

correct
iCourl:

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of December,

copy of the attached
File and Serve:

2019, served a true and

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of

JUSTIN M. CURTIS

DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

